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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The National Association of Social Workers
("NASW") and its Ohio Chapter respectfully submit
this brief as amici curiae in support of Petitioners. 1
NASW is the largest professional organization of
social workers in the United States. It represents
over 130,000 social workers with chapters in each of
the fifty States, as well as in the District of
Columbia, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Puerto
Rico. The Ohio Chapter of NASW has over 4,300
members. Since its inception in 1955, NASW has
worked to develop and maintain high standards of
professional practice in the field of social work, to
advance sound social policies, and to strengthen and
unify the social work profession. Its activities in
furtherance of these goals include promulgating
professional standards (including Standards for
Social Work Practice in Child Welfare), enforcing the
NASW Code of Ethics, conducting research,
publishing materials relevant to the profession, and
providing continuing education.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici curiae
state that no counsel for any party authored this
brief in whole or in part, and that no entity or
person, other than amici, its members, or its counsel
made any monetary contribution towards the
preparation and submission of this brief. Counsel of
record for all parties have consented to the filing of
this brief in a letter filed with the Clerk's office.
1

2

NASW and its Ohio Chapter have a significant
and direct interest in this case. If the Sixth Circuit's
decision is allowed to stand, NASW members will be
exposed to personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
That, in turn, may ultimately lead to reduced
protection of the profession's most valuable and
vulnerable clients - abused children.
The Sixth Circuit's decision - denying qualified
immunity to social workers who removed child-abuse
victims without a warrant - may also alter the entire
manner in which social workers evaluate child abuse
matters. Child abuse is one of the most sensitive and emblematic - areas treated by social workers.
Indeed, the social work profession ''has always
advocated on behalf of those affected by poverty,
neglect, and disadvantage. From this perspective,
social work's efforts on behalf of at-risk children and
their families are perhaps the profession's most
perfect fit." Tracy Whitaker, Toby Weismiller &
Elizabeth J. Clark, Assuring the Sufficiency of a
Frontline Workforce: A National Study of Licensed
Social Workers, NASW, 8 (Mar. 2006), available at
http://workforce.socialworkers.org I studies I children/
childrenJamilies.pdf. But while "social workers have
been steadfast in their professional and personal
commitments to protect children... by developing
programs and social supports that help prevent child
abuse," id, at 8-9, the Sixth Circuit ruled that social
workers should be held personally liable for a
reasonable removal of these same abused children.
The Sixth Circuit's decision came despite the fact
that the "social workers faced an uncertain legal and
factual landscape," Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County

3

Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 724 F.3d 687, 710
(6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., dissenting); despite the
fact that "a state court judge found three days later
that they acted properly," id.; despite the
"undisputed [fact] that [the social workers] held the
subjective belief that their actions were authorized
by the juvenile court's standing order and the
circumstances," Kovacic, 809 F. Supp. 2d 754, 794
(N.D. Ohio, 2011) (District Court findings); and
despite the fact that the social workers based their
decision on legal advice provided by "an assistant
prosecuting attorney." Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 692. Yet,
despite all of these facts, the Sixth Circuit held that
the social workers could be personally liable for their
decision to remove the abused children.
Conversely, this Court has held - under
considerably less favorable facts for both social
worker and child - that no personal liability should
attach where a social worker made a decision not to
remove a child. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't
of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (child not
removed suffers permanent brain damage). NASW
now invites this Court to hold the same for child
removal cases.
In other words, NASW asks this Court to stand in
the shoes of social - and other child protective
services - workers, who are charged with the daily
protection of abused children, and apply qualified
immunity to those workers in all reasonable removal
cases.

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
"Child abuse and neglect is one of the Nation's
most serious concerns." U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., Admin. For Children & Families,
Child Maltreatment 2012, 1 (2012), available at
http: I lwww.acf.hhs.gov/ sites/ default/files I cb/ cm2
012.pdf. There are many forms of child abuse physical, psychological, sexual, and plain neglect. Id.
at 21 (Exh. 3-E). At the end of the child-abuse harm
spectrum lies death. And the numbers are
staggering: From 2001 to 2010, more than 15,500
child-abuse deaths have been recorded in the U.S. nearly threefold the amount of military deaths in
both Iraq and Afghanistan during that same period
(5,877). See Every Child Matters Educational Fund,
Child Abuse & Neglect Deaths in America 1 (Table 1)
(2012), available at http://www.everychildmatters.org
/storage/documents/pdf/reports/can_report_august20
12_final.pdf. In 2011 and 2012, 1,580 and 1,640 more
children died, respectively, as result of abuse. Child
Maltreatment, supra, at 52 (Exh. 4-A).
Congress, in an attempt to respond to the widespread problem of child abuse, passed the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA).
CAPTA was first signed into law on January 31,
1974, and reauthorized in 1978, 1984, 1988, 1992,
1996, 2003, and 2010 (42 U.S.C § 5101 et seq.; 42
U.S.C. § 5116 et seq.). At the heart of CAPTA lies a
federal grant program, allowing the States to develop
better training programs and innovative responses
"to reports of child abuse and neglect." (See 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106(a)(l-2)).

5

The fight against child abuse is also a legislative
priority at the state level. All fifty states and the
District of Columbia have child-abuse prevention
laws; and each has provisions allowing social
workers, under certain circumstances, to remove
abused children from their home.2

See ALA. CODE § 26-14-6 (1975); ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.10.142 (2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-821
(2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-1001 (2011); CAL.
WEL. & INST. § 305 (1988); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 19-3-308 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § l 7a-101
(2013); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 16 § 907 (1999); D.C.
CODE § 4-1303.04 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.401
(2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-ll (2013); IDAHO
CODE§ 16-1608 (2005); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 515
(1998); IND. CODE § 31-34-2-1 (1997); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 232.79 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2231
(2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.060 (1998); LA.
CHILD. CODE ANN. ART. 620 (2006); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 22 § 4023 (2004); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW
§ 5-709 (2012); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 119 § 24
(2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.630 (1999); MINN.
STAT.§ 260C.148 (2005);Mrss. CODE ANN.§ 43-21-303
(1980); Mo. STAT. ANN.§ 210.125 (1982); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-301 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43248 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.390 (2011);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:6-a (2002); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-8.27 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-6
(2005); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW. § 417 (2009); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-500 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-06
(2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.31 (2002); OKLA.
STAT. TIT. lOA § 1-4-201 (2009); OR. REV. STAT.
2

6

Social workers, as part of the child protective
services (CPS) workforce, stand at the forefront in
the fight against child abuse. In 2012 alone - the last
year for which data is available - child protective
services responded to well over three million reports
of child abuse. Child Maltreatment, supra, at 18
(Exh. 3-A) (3,184,000 unique reports responded to in
2012). The removal of a child from his or her home never an easy decision - is a measure taken by social
workers only after the child is found to be in some
form of imminent danger - either of physical harm
(as in the instant case, or in the case of Joshua
DeShaney), of death (as nearly three children die
every day in America from child abuse), or other type
of harm. Only under those circumstances would a
social worker decide to remove a child from the
home,
attempting
to
prevent
irreparable
consequences.
And that is precisely what happened in this case.
In a meeting preceding the decision to remove the
children, family members and police officers reported
to the social workers that the children "were in
§ 419B.150 (2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6369 (1995);
R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 40-ll-5(d) (1996); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 63-7-660 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-12
(1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-l-114(a)(2) (1999);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.104 (2005); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78A-6-106 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 33
§ 5301 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1517 (2003);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.050 (1999); W.VA.
CODE§ 49-6-3 (2012); WIS. STAT.§ 4S.19 (1997); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-405 (2005).
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'imminent risk' of physical harm" from their mother.
Kovacic, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (District Court
findings). Based on that information, the social
workers concluded that "the Kovacic children were at
a more elevated risk than they first thought, and
determined it was immediately necessary to remove
Daniel and Katherine from [their mother]'s home in
light of [the social workers'] belief that the children
were in imminent danger of physical harm." Id. The
social workers then sought legal advice, and received
"the signature of the assigned assistant prosecuting
attorney." Id. Only then did they proceed to remove
the children. And three days later a juvenile court
magistrate approved. Yet, three years later, in a
federal court, the social workers were denied the
benefit of the qualified immunity defense.
NASW's first argument is simple. To protect
children from abuse - a major congressional and
state legislative goal - this Court should apply
qualified immunity to protect social workers from
personal liability where a reasonable decision has
been made to remove a child without a warrant.
NASW's second argument is equally cogent.
DeShaney was decided 25 years ago. Since then, this
Court's "continued silence" on the issue, Kovacic, 724
F.3d at 708 (Sutton, J., dissenting), has failed "to
provide guidance to those charged with the difficult
task of protecting child welfare within the confines of
the Fourth Amendment." Camreta v. Greene, 131 S.
Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011). In light of the circuit split on
this issue - compare Hatch v. Dep't for Children, 274
F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2001) with Kovacic, 724 F.3d (6th

8
Cir. 2013) - guidance from this Court is more
necessary today than ever.

ARGUMENT
I.

To PROTECT CHILDREN FROM ABUSE - A
MAJOR
CONGRESSIONAL AND
STATE
LEGISLATIVE GOAL - THIS COURT SHOULD
GRANT QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TO SOCIAL
WORKERS
MAKING
A
REASONABLE
DECISION TO REMOVE A CHILD WITHOUT
A WARRANT.

A. Congress And The States Place
Child-Abuse Protection, Including
Removal, As A Top Legislative
Priority.
Child-abuse prevention and treatment are major
Congressional priorities. By title alone, the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act - which has
been reauthorized seven times since first being
signed into law in 1974 - epitomizes that approach.
Congress still considers the issue of "abuse, neglect,
and [child] fatalities" to be "of significant social
concerns in our Nation." Opening Statement of
Ranking Member Platts, U.S. House Comm. On
Educ. & Labor's Subcomm. On Healthy Families &
Cmtys., Preventing Child Abuse and Improving
Responses to Families in Crisis, 1 (Nov. 5, 2009),
available at archives.republicans.edlabor.house.gov
I hearingsMarkup_details. aspx? NewsID= 133 7.

9

While CAPTA does not deal directly with the
issue of child removal, the States - which are the
grantees under CAPTA - have all enacted provisions
allowing the removal of child abuse victims from
their homes. 3
Ohio, for example, had two statutory provisions in
2002, which are still valid today, authorizing social and other child protective services - workers to
remove children from their homes in cases of
suspected abuse. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN
§§ 2151.3l(A)(3)(a), (A)(6)(a); Kovacic, 724 F.3d at
700 n.7. In this case, the social workers relied on
section 2151.3l(A)(3)(a), which authorizes child
removal by social workers when "[t]here are
reasonable grounds to believe that the child is
suffering from illness or injury and is not receiving
proper care, ... and the child removal is necessary to
prevent immediate or threatened physical or
emotional harm." (Emphasis added).
In the case at bar, not only were the social
workers of the (reasonable) opinion that all these
conditions had been met, but so too was the
prosecuting attorney who signed the Temporary Care
Order allowing the removal, id. at 692, and the
family-court judge who reviewed the matter three
days later. Id. The Ohio statutory wording is not
unusual. Many state legislators use similarly-worded
provisions, requiring some degree of "imminent
danger," to authorize the removal of children without
a prior hearing.4

See supra, Note 2.
4 See supra, Note 2.
3

'.
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B. Protecting Children From Abuse,
Including
Removal,
Is
Often
Performed By Social Workers As
Part Of A Child Protective Services
Team.
To protect children from abuse - to effectuate the
legislative goals articulated by Congress and the
States - the law requires agents. In many cases,
those State agents are social workers. As a recent
NASW standards' publication suggests: "Child
welfare systems across the country serve some of the
most vulnerable children, youths, and families.
These systems are designed to support families and
to protect children from harm through an array of
prevention and intervention services; in particular,
they are designed to support children who have been
or are at risk of abuse or neglect. Historically, social
workers have played critical roles in these systems.
Studies indicate that social work degrees are the
most appropriate degrees for this field of practice and
have been directly linked to better outcomes for
children and families and retention of staff." Kim
Day, Carol Harper & Carmen D. Weisner, NASW
Standards For Social Work Practice In Child
Welfare, 5-6 (2013) (citations omitted), available at
http://www.socialworkers.org/practice/standards/chil
dwelfarestandards2012.pdf.
Indeed, social workers were accurately described
as the "frontline workforce" in the 'fight to protect
children from abuse. See Assuring the Sufficiency of a

11

Frontline Workforce, supra, at 10 ("The study
confirms that licensed social workers are highly
involved in providing direct services to children and
their families in a variety of community settings. In
fact, 78 percent of all licensed social workers provide
services to clients age 21 or younger, regardless of
the[ir] practice setting of focus."). And being on the
frontlines calls, almost inevitably, for the need to
make extremely difficult decisions under extremely
difficult conditions.
Thus, for example, in the county from which this
case has emerged, "every day the frontline social
workers for the Cuyahoga County's Department of
Children and Family Services fight to save kids.
Their job calls for making difficult decisions, and a
lot of them. The 450 case workers deal with nearly
8,000 families a year, including 1,800 children in
foster care or other forms of custody." Laura
Johnston, Cuyahoga County Children and Family
Services Workers Strive to Save Kids, THE PLAIN
DEALER,
Nov.
24,
2012,
available
at
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2012/11/cu
yahoga_county_childrens_serv.html. And the type of
work performed by those social workers often takes a
considerable emotional toll. As recently noted with
regards to the Cuyahoga County social workers:
"Social workers rarely leave their jobs at the office.
Some try, but more often than not, they fail. The
round-the-clock demands and emotional toll of
dealing with abused or neglected children inevitably
bleed into evenings, weekends and vacations. And
just as inevitably, the workers' spouses and children
share in the pain and disappointments." Laura

12
Johnston, Children's Services Job Tahes Toll on
Workers, Families, THE PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 26, 2012,
available at http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.
ssf/2012/11/childrens_services_job_takes_t.html.
Finally, child removal - the act of taking a child
"from his or her normal place of residence to a foster
care setting," Child Maltreatment, supra at 119 - is
perhaps the hardest task performed by social
workers. Indeed, "the cases that really get to the
[Cuyahoga County social workers], the ones that
they can't leave at the office, are the unusual ones:
emaciated toddlers, 8-year-olds pocked with cigarette
burns, teenagers abandoned because their parents
don't want them anymore. The worst cases, they
agree, require them to take a child away from a
parent, sometimes even wrench an infant from the
arms of a sobbing mother. Those cases can haunt for
life." Social Workers Strive to Save Kids, Id. at 3.
C. Therefore, To Protect Children
From Abuse, This Court Should
Protect Social Workers By Granting
Qualified
Immunity
When
A
Reasonable Decision To Remove A
Child Has Been Made.

Since protection from child abuse is a major
federal and state legislative priority, and since the
persons entrusted with such a task includes social
workers, the logical conclusion is that (legislative)
protection of children from abuse requires (judicial)
protection of social workers from personal liability
when they act reasonably. While NASW does not
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contend that every decision to remove a child without
a warrant should be exempted from liability, it does
contend that reasonable decisions to remove should
be granted qualified immunity. See, e.g., Stanton v.
Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) ("Qualified immunity
gives government officials breathing room to make
reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.") (citation omitted).
What constitutes a "reasonable" decision to
remove? As in this case, three elements may satisfy a
prima facie case of reasonableness. First, the social
workers engaged in a pre-removal consultation with
family members, other social workers, and, as
appropriate here, the police, to assess the current
level of risk to the child. See Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 702
("Say you are a social worker ... On March 26, 2002
you and five other social workers and officers along
with several members of the Kovacic family meet to
discuss the situation, and, with your operational silos
removed, discuss the risk that the mother might
imminently harm the two children." (Sutton, J.,
dissenting)). Second, the social workers obtained a
pre-removal consultation with, and approval of, a
state attorney, presumably finding the removal to
comply with state-law requirements. See Kovacic,
809 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (removal order issued only
after social workers received "the signature of the
assigned assistant prosecuting attorney."). Third, the
social workers took part in a post-removal judicial
hearing that took place as soon as possible after the
removal. (While judicial confirmation of the
removal's necessity is not required for determination
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of reasonableness, 5 such finding may increase its
likelihood. See Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 703 ("Within
three days, and again consistent with state law, a
state court judge holds a hearing. She finds that the
requisite endangerment and emergency existed,
requiring the children to remain in state custody."
(Sutton, J., dissenting))).
Establishing these three elements - the preremoval peer consultation, the legal approval, and
the post-removal judicial hearing - provides a prima
facie case of reasonableness warranting the grant of
The inquiry into the
qualified immunity.
reasonableness of the decision alone - rather the
constitutionality of the actions taken by the social
workers - may also alleviate some of the concerns
voiced by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas in
their dissenting opinions in Camreta, regarding the
unnecessary inquiry into complex constitutional
issues. See 131 S.Ct. at 2036 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 2037 (Kennedy, J., joined by Thomas,
J., dissenting).6

See, e.g., Hatch v. Dep't for Children, 274 F.3d 12
(1st Cir. 2001) (qualified immunity granted despite
judicial finding to the contrary).
6 Such a simple inquiry may also prevent fractured
opinions by the federal Court of Appeals, such as
when five judges of the same court were in favor of
granting qualified immunity in case of child removal
- even willing to "shake [the social worker's] hand"
for the work he has done to prevent child abuse while others vote to deny an en bane h'earing entirely
following a finding of no qualified immunity.
5
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II.

THIS COURT'S "CONTINUED SILENCE" ON
THE ISSUE SINCE DESHANEY (1989), AND
THE

CIRCUIT

SPLIT

THAT

MERIT TIMELY GUIDANCE

EMERGED,

FOR

THOSE

CHARGED WITH PROTECTING CHILDREN
FROM ABUSE.

A. DeShaney (1989) Left The Issue Of
Personal Liability In Cases Of Child
Removal Unresolved.
In DeShaney, this Court dealt with the matter of
4-year-old Joshua DeShaney, who was beaten so
severely by his father that "he fell into a lifethreatening coma. Emergency brain surgery revealed
a series of hemorrhages caused by traumatic injuries
to the head inflicted over a long period of time.
Joshua did not die, but he suffered brain damage so
severe that he [was] expected to spend the rest of his
life confined to an institution for the profoundly
retarded." 489 U.S. at 194.
In DeShaney, the question before the Court was
whether, under those circumstances, the social
worker should be held personally liable under § 1983
for her decision not to remove the child - her "failure
to intervene to protect him." Id. at 193. The Court
held that no personal liability would attach "for

Southerland v. City of New York, 681 F.3d 122, 13839 (2d Cir. 2012) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en bane).
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failure to act in situations such as the present one."
Id. at 203. The opinion was not unanimous, however,
containing a moving dissent. 7 It is still applicable
law, however, and has been for the past 25 years.
Importantly, the Court acknowledged - but left
open - the question of the correct law to apply in
opposite cases, where social workers intervened and
removed a child before a tragedy occurred: "In
defense of [the social workers] is must also be said
that had they moved too soon to take custody of the
son away from the father, they would likely have
been met with charges of improperly intruding into
the parent-child relationship, charges based on the
same Due Process Clause that forms the basis for the
present charge of failure to provide adequate

7

See Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall

and Blackmun joined, dissenting: "Poor Joshua!
Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible,
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and
abandoned by respondents [social workers] who
placed him in a dangerous predicament and who
knew or learned what was going on, and yet did
essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly
observes, 'dutifully recorded these incidents in [their]
files.' It is a sad commentary upon American life, and
constitutional principles ... that this child, Joshua
DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder
of his life profoundly retarded." id. at 213 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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protection." Id. at 203. This, in essence, is the
question before the Court today.s

B. Since DeShaney, A Circuit Split Has
Emerged With Regards To Social
Workers' Personal Liability In
Cases OfWarrantless Removal.

DeShaney was decided 25 years ago. Since then,
this Court's "continued silence" on the issue, Kovacic,
724 F.3d at 708 (Sutton, J., dissenting), has failed "to
provide guidance to those charged with the difficult
task of protecting child welfare within the confines of
the Fourth Amendment." Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at
2032. Beyond the lack of guidance, however, lies a
deeper issue. DeShaney left many a social worker
wondering - just before the proverbial "knock on the
door," just prior to committing to the life-altering
decision of removing a child - whether they should
take any action at all. Should they refrain from
acting, no personal liability would attach. As one
commentator observed, "[following DeShaney,] the
social worker is expected not only to make an
incredibly difficult and consequential decision with
imperfect information, but to do so in a legal
s Amici are aware of the fact that the decision below
rests both on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds. For purpose of the present context, however
- the acknowledgement that social workers may be
personally exposed for acting either too early or too
late - Amici respectfully submit that this Court's
remarks apply equally on both grounds.

.,,,I
ii:1
:!

II

.I

I

•

18
framework that provides dramatic incentives for
inaction .... DeShaney tells the social worker that it is
safer from a standpoint of personal liability to leave
an endangered child in the home than to attempt to
remove him." Rebecca Aviel, Restoring Equipoise to
Child Welfare, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 401, 404, 413 (2010) .
NASW agrees with that commentator, who also
recommends that "a system that has been
characterized as approaching at, or past the breaking
point should not be further stressed with a legal
framework that skews the incentives for its decision
makers by punishing only erroneous decisions to
act." Id. at 404. But such "punishment" is precisely
what the Sixth Circuit has inflicted with its decision
below. It leaves social - and other child protective
service - workers with a substantial disincentive for
carrying out CAPTA's mission, to protect children
from harm. NASW now urges this Court to reverse
this undesirable result.
Since DeShaney, the Circuit Courts have been
split with regards to whether qualified immunity
should be granted to social workers in cases of
warrantless removal. Obviously, the Sixth Circuit's
decision below held that no qualified immunity
should be accorded in such a case, based on both
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 702. Similarly, the Second
Circuit held in 2011 that qualified immunity should
be denied to a social worker under somewhat similar
circumstances, on both Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds. Southerland v. City of New
Yorh, 680 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011).
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Conversely, the First Circuit held in a case that
"would have covered the social workers here,"
Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 706 (Sutton, J., dissenting), that
a social worker should be granted qualified immunity
in a warrantless removal case - even where the
family court, which initially issued an ex-parte order
of temporary custody, ultimately found "that there
was no probable cause to believe that [the child] had
been abused." Hatch v. Dep't for Children, 274 F.3d
12, 18 (1st Cir. 2001). Although Hatch was decided
on Fourteenth Amendment grounds alone, its
holding is still instructive: "We need to go no further.
The record shows that [the social worker] had a
reasonable basis both for suspecting child abuse and
for believing [the child] to be in danger (and,
therefore, that he acted justifiably in taking the boy
into temporary custody). The fact that this suspicion
proved, in the long run, to be unfounded does not
strip [the social worker] of his entitlement to
qualified immunity in regard to a claim of damages.
See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)
(emphasizing that the qualified immunity standard
protects many mistaken judgments.)" Hatch, 27 4
F.3d at 25. 9

Hatch is still good law. See Hootstein v. Collins, 928
F. Supp. 2d 326, 333 (D. Mass. 2013) (citing Hatch
for the proposition that "the state may separate the
child from the parent, before any hearing in which it
would be required to show cause for such a
separation.").
9

20
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit, relying on Hatch,
held in a warrantless removal case that qualified
immunity should be granted. Gomes v. Wood, 451
F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, too, the court's
summary is instructive: "When confronted with
evidence of child abuse, [social workers] may be
required to make 'on-the-spot judgments on the basis
of limited and often conflicting information,' Hatch,
274 F.3d at 22, with limited resources to assist them.
They must balance the parents' interest in the care,
custody, and control of their children with the state's
interest in protecting the children's welfare .... In the
circumstances of this case, imposing the added
burden of potential liability for damages under
§ 1983 would interfere unnecessarily with the
performance of a difficult and essential job." Gomes,
451 F.3d at 44-45.
The split is clear. In DeShaney, this Court
explained the grant of certiorari both "[b]ecause of
the inconsistent approaches taken by the lower
courts," and "the importance of the issue to the
administration of state and local governments."
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194. Respectfully, NASW
suggests that the same applies in this case.
C. Today, More Than 130,000 Social
Workers
And
Fellow
Child
Protective Services Staff Await
This Court's Guidance On The
Issue.

Following the Sixth Circuit decision, more than
130,000 NASW members find themselves in a
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confused legal landscape: should they decide to
refrain from action and leave a child abused they are
protected from personal liability by DeShaney;
should they decide to take action, however, and
remove the child from abuse their exposure to
personal liability is circuit dependent.
Thus, for example, should the removal take place
in Cleveland, Ohio, the social workers will likely be
personally liable for their actions. If, however, the
same removal takes place in Denver, Colorado, no
such personal liability will attach.
This legal landscape provides negative incentives
to take action (exposing not only the social workers
to personal liability, but also the children to
unnecessary and preventable risk). This legal
landscape is also inconsistent, arbitrary, and unjust.
It presents social workers with a dilemma of almost
Salamonie proportions: should they refrain from
action, exposing the child to risk of permanent harm
or even death while remaining protected legally
(DeShaney), or should they act, saving the child but
exposing themselves to personal liability? Indeed,
"[t]he decisions caseworkers make every day would
challenge King Solomon, yet most of them lack
Solomon's wisdom, few enjoy his credibility with the
public, and none command his resources." Richard
Behrman, Mary Larner & Carol Stevenson,
Protecting Children from Abuse and Neglect:
Analysis and Recommendations, 8 FUTURE OF
CHILDREN NO.l, 4, (1998), available at http://
futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/do
cs/08_0 l_Analysis. pdf.
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For these reasons, this Court's guidance is timely
and this case provides the appropriate vehicle for
doing so. Thus Ohio, the state from which this case
emerged is, unfortunately, one of leaders in childabuse statistics nationwide. While in terms of overall
population Ohio is seventh in the nation, it ranked
fifth in 2010 in terms of per-capita child abuserelated deaths, with 83 deaths reported that year
alone. See Child Abuse & Neglect Deaths, supra, at
17. Some of these deaths could have been potentially
prevented had the children been removed. In
addition, 29,250 incidents of child abuse and neglect
were reported in Ohio in 2012 alone, with each of the
preceding four years registering over 30,000 abuse
cases a year. See Child Maltreatment 2012, Id. at 30.
In light of this data, the need for legal guidance is
clear.

CONCLUSION
Allowing the Sixth Circuit decision to stand would
substantially impair the ability of social workers to
protect children from abuse - a major Congressional
and States' legislative priority. This Court has
protected social workers from personal liability
before,
under
less
favorable
circumstances
(DeShaney). Today, this Court is called to extend this
protection of qualified immunity from inaction to
reasonable action. Such a result would properly align
the social workers' interests with that of Congress's
and the States' - to protect children from abuse. To
address these important issues, amici respectfully
ask that the Court grant Certiorari in this matter.
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